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Convergence of Double Auctions to Pareto Optimal 
Allocations in the Edgeworth Box 
 
The Edgeworth box is used to model exchanges among agents with given preferences and 
endowments. The contract curve and competitive equilibrium are derived by assuming that agents 
maximize their utility while staying within their opportunity sets. We show that agents need not 
maximize utility to achieve Pareto-efficient outcomes. Double auctions with “zero-intelligence” 
traders (ZI), who possess just enough rationality to stay within their opportunity sets (or are 
constrained by market rules to do so), achieve Pareto-efficient outcomes. Our simulations, which 
readers can download and run on their computers,1 show how the elemental forces of want and 
scarcity cause Pareto-efficient outcomes even when agents do not maximize and when no 
evolutionary processes exist. 
Beginning with Chamberlin (1948), economists have studied experimental economies with 
profit-motivated human subjects.  Smith (1962) showed that double auctions, although different 
from Walrasian tatonnement, still yield prices and quantities close to competitive equilibrium. Gode 
and Sunder (1993, 1997) showed how even profit seeking is not necessary for approximate Pareto 
efficient allocations. Minimal rationality (avoid losses but do not worry about profits, termed “zero 
intelligence”) suffices. Bosch and Sunder (2000) generalized the result to multiple interacting 
markets.  
Prior studies, however, have examined partial equilibrium settings in which individual supply 
and demand functions are exogenous. This paper uses a two-good Edgeworth box in a general 
equilibrium setting to study double auctions with profit-motivated human traders and ZI traders. 
                                                 
1 Readers can download simulations from http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/sunder/exe/simul3.exe. 
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Economic Parameters 
Group 1 agents’ Cobb-Douglas utility function for two commodities is U=c1α c21-α and Group 2 
agents’ utility is V = c1β c21-β. Group 1 endowment is (x1, y1). 
The contract curve is given by: 
(1-α)(1-y)/αy = (1-β)(1-x)/βx.    (1) 
The competitive equilibrium holdings are given by: 
(α(x1+y1/pe), (1-α)(pe x1+y1)).    (2) 
And, the equilibrium price in units of y per unit of x is given by: 
pe = ((αy1+ β(1-y1))/(1-α)x1+(1-β)(1-x1))  (3) 
See Figure 1. The endowment point is A, the competitive equilibrium holding is C, and the 
competitive equilibrium price pe is the slope of line AC. 
I. Human Experiments 
Two groups of 14 subjects each traded in one session. Each Group 1 member had an endowment 
of 44 green chips and 9 red chips and a 50 x 50 grid showing the utility of various combinations of 
chips (Table 1A) for utility function U = c10.6 c20.4. Each Group 2 member had an endowment of 6 
green and 41 red chips and another 50 x 50 grid (Table 1B) showing the utility of various 
combinations of chips for utility function V = c10.8 c20.2. In both tables, the cell showing the initial 
endowment was circled. Subjects could walk about the room to find another trader they could trade 
with to increase their utility. In competitive equilibrium, each member of Group 1 holds 29 green 
and 39 red chips, which implies that each member of Group 2 holds 21 green and 11 red chips. The 
competitive equilibrium price is 0.49 green chips for each red chip, and it raises the utility of Group 
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1 members from 0.933 to 1.31 and raises the utility of Group 2 members from 0.35 to 0.73. The 
contract curve is given by the equation Red = 8 Green /(3 + 5 Green). 
Figures 2 and 3 show the results of this single session experiment. Figure 2 shows the 
normalized Edgeworth box. The endowment point is A (0.88, 0.18) and the competitive equilibrium 
point is C (0.58, 0.79). Solid triangles show the actual final holdings of Group 1 members and 
hollow circles show the final holdings of Group 2 members. The average holdings of the two groups 
are given by the solid square (0.57, 0.69).  
Group 1 members increased their utility from 0.933 to an average utility of 1.22, which is about 
93 percent of the competitive equilibrium utility. Group 2 members increased their utility from 0.35 
to an average utility 0.803, which is about 110 percent of the competitive equilibrium utility. All 28 
participants traded and 26 of them improved their welfare. One Group 1 member remained on the 
indifference utility curve at endowment, and one Group 2 member traded to a lower utility level.  
Figure 3 shows the transaction price sequence (number of green chips per red chip). Transaction 
prices are constrained because the number of green and red chips must be integers. The average 
transaction price of 0.64 was higher than the competitive equilibrium price of 0.49. Overall, in this 
single shot experiment, the subjects got close to the contract curve and competitive equilibrium, but 
fell short of achieving it. We expect human performance to improve with experience and 
unconstrained prices.  
II. ZI Computational Experiments 
A. ZI trader behavior 
ZIs choose bids and offers randomly from a set, shown by the shaded area in Figure 4A, that is 
feasible and that does not make them worse off. Thus, the trader in Figure 4A either tries to buy X 
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units to move in the southeast direction in the shaded area, or tries to sell X units to move in the 
northwest direction in the shaded area. Either move raises its utility.  
The ZI traders are minimally rational in the sense that they simply try to climb their utility hill, 
choosing randomly from the available set of steps that takes them to a higher level. They act only 
locally. and do not even optimize within their local opportunity set. They have no memory, and they 
do not observe the actions of other market participants.  
ZI traders are implemented as follows. At any time, each ZI trader submits a bid B that specifies 
the number of Y units the trader is willing to pay for one X unit. and an ask A that specifies the 
number of Y units the trader is willing to accept for one X unit. Thus, a trader’s bids and asks and 
bids are slopes of lines measured in angles along which the trader is willing to move.  
If each transaction involved infinitesimally small quantities, a trader in Group 1 would bid a 
uniformly distributed random angle between 0 and the slope (ω) of his indifference curve passing 
through his holdings and ask a uniformly distributed random angle between ω and π/2. However, to 
ensure that simulations finish in finite time, we require finite quantities per transaction.  We specify 
the size of each transaction in terms of the Euclidean distance r between the pre- and post-
transaction holdings; i.e., r= (x2 + y2)1/2 where x and y are the quantities of the respective 
commodities exchanged in the transaction. For our simulations, we set r= 0.02. Specifying the size 
of the transaction in x or y exclusively would bias the results because of discreteness. 
The finite transaction size r implies that Trader 1 can no longer bid between 0 and ω (slope of 
the indifference curve) and ask between ω and π/2 because such bids and asks may fall below the 
indifference curve. Instead, as shown in Figure 4B, the bids and asks of size r  must lie on arcs Bid 1, 
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Bid 2, Ask 1, and Ask 2, which are arcs of a circle of radius r bounded by utility increasing 
opportunity sets for each trader. 
Therefore, a trader from Group 1 bids a random angle that is uniformly distributed over the 
angle subtended by the arc Bid 1, and asks a random angle that is uniformly distributed over the 
angle subtended by the arc Ask 1. Analogously,  a trader from Group 2 bids a random angle that is 
uniformly distributed over the angle subtended by the arc Bid 2 and asks a random angle that is 
uniformly distributed over the angle subtended by the arc Ask 2. A transaction occurs when the 
highest bid exceeds the lowest ask and the transaction price is the midpoint of the two. 
B. Economic Parameters 
Figure 5 shows the four economies that we simulated with ZI traders. As is shown in Figure 1, 
the straight line AC joins the endowment point A to the competitive equilibrium point C on the 
contract curve. The slope of line AC is the competitive equilibrium price. A broken line AD is the 
bisection locus of the angle between the two indifference maps. Starting from the initial endowment 
point A, it intersects the contract curve at D. Table 2 lists the parameters of the four economies.  
C. Convergence to Contract Curve  
The short bars in Figure 6 show the path of holdings after each transaction starting from 
endowment point A to the end of the simulation. The distance between the consecutive bars is the 
size of the simulation step r (discrete transaction size), which was described earlier.  
All computational economies terminate at the contract curve. The path of holdings may not end 
exactly at the contract curve due to the discreteness of the simulation. This deviation is never more 
than r/2, one half of the simulation step.  
The reason why all paths end at the contract curve is easy to see from Figure 7, where A is the 
endowment and the two curves passing through this point are the indifference maps of the two 
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groups of traders. The center of arc BC is A and the radius of arc BC is the transaction size r. All 
points on arc BC are feasible after the first transaction, but the double auction mechanism makes the 
points closer to the center of arc BC more likely than the points near the bounds set by the 
indifference curves. Suppose point D on arc BC is the holding after the first transaction. Arc BC 
which is centered at holding D and is bounded by the indifference maps passing through D now 
defines the feasible holdings after the second transaction, and so on. These iterations explain how the 
simulation reaches the contract curve (subject to the discrete step constraint discussed above), and 
terminate only when no further increases in utility through exchange are possible. 
D. Competitive Equilibrium 
Figure 6 shows that the computational economies reach the contract curve near, but not at, 
competitive equilibrium. Figure 8 shows the distribution of the ends of 100 simulations of the four 
economies from Figure 5. The short bars mark the path of one simulation for each economy. A cross 
indicates the mean or centroid of these 100 endpoints. Compared to Figure 6, the scale has been 
expanded to zoom in on the competitive equilibrium point C. As shown, the competitive equilibrium 
is not the centroid of endpoints of 100 simulations indicated by hollow circles. Instead, the endpoints 
are distributed around D, the point at which the contract curve intersects the locus of the curve 
bisecting the angle between the indifference maps originating at endowment A, as shown by the 
broken line AD. The final holdings are scattered around D in a band with an approximate width r, the 
discrete transaction size. A small downward bias is due to the random chance that the last transaction 
may not occur within the specified number of iterations. 
E. Transaction Prices 
Figure 9 shows the transaction price series for a single run of each of the four computational 
economies. In addition, the thick line shows the average and standard deviation of the ith transaction 
  
Convergence of Double Auctions in Edgeworth Box, June 4, 2004 8
over the 100 runs of each economy. The horizontal line is the competitive equilibrium price. The 
transaction prices tend to follow the bisection locus. This curve is convex for Economies 1 and 2, 
and their mean price increases from earlier to latter transactions. Since this curve is concave for 
Economies 3 and 4, the mean price decreases as trading proceeds. Finally, prices converge to a close 
neighborhood of the CE price, even though the final allocation deviates from the CE allocation. The 
small curvature of the contract curve causes the price at the intersection of contract curve and the 
bisection locus to be close to the CE price. 
III. Concluding Remarks 
Prior studies in partial equilibrium settings have shown that agents need not maximize their 
profits for markets to achieve Pareto efficient outcomes. It is not obvious whether such partial 
equilibrium results with exogenously fixed demand and supply extend to general equilibrium 
settings. In this paper, we examine a more realistic setting of a classical pure exchange economy 
modeled as an Edgeworth box. Theoretical results for such economies are derived using utility 
maximizing agents and Walrasian tatonnement. Our computational economies use a double auction 
mechanism with multiple rounds of trading among “zero-intelligence” (ZI) traders who bid and ask 
randomly within their opportunity sets. Our finding that these economies also achieve Pareto 
efficient allocations makes two contributions. 
First, exchange economies may be Pareto efficient with agents whose decision rules fall far 
short of utility maximization. Rules of market institutions such as double auctions transform barely 
rational individual actions into rational aggregate outcomes. Second, our ZI simulations are  a 
tractable way to model, analyze, and gain insights into how and why statistical interactions among 
simple individual decision rules yield efficient market outcomes.  
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Our results suggest another look at the critique of the maximization assumption in economics. 
Many question the descriptive validity of utility maximization-based economic theories because of 
the cognitive limitations of human beings. Our results show that even when agents do not maximize 
their utility, the allocations derived from utility maximizing models may remain valid in market 
institutions. We do, however, need to understand how and why this happens. North (1990) and 
Simon (1996) suggest identifying the performance characteristics of social and economic institutions 
that may be largely independent of the variations in participant behavior. Our method is a step in that 
direction.  
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Appendix: Viewing the Edgeworth Box Simulation Live on Your Computer 
You can use your computer to look at the dynamics of convergence of a two-good Edgeworth 
Box economy to the contract curve with ZI traders as follows. 
 
Software Name: Simul3.exe 
Reference: D. K. Gode, Stephen E. Spear and Shyam Sunder, “Convergence of Double Auctions 
to Pareto Optimal Allocations in the Edgeworth Box,” Revised May 2004. On the web: 
http://www.som.yale.edu/Faculty/sunder/Edgeworth/Edgeworth.pdf. 
 
Hardware: Personal computer (DOS/Windows) 
 
To Get the Software: Download a copy of file simul3.exe from 
http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/sunder/zisoft.html and store it on your hard drive or a 
floppy. You may also run it directly from the abovementioned website. 
 
To Run the Simulation: 
When you run simul3.exe, 
1. The computer prompts you for an initializing random seed. Enter any number between -32,768 
and 32767, and press the ENTER key. 
2. The computer prompts you for your choice of the speed of simulation. Enter any number 
between 1 (slow) to 100 (fast), and press the ENTER key. 
3. The computer prompts you for how frequently you wish to have the indifference maps 
redrawn on the screen. Enter a number between 1 (to redraw the indifference maps after every 
iteration) and 501 (to never redraw the indifference maps) and press the ENTER key. Enjoy the 
show. 
 
What You See on the Screen: 
 
Edgeworth Box: The endowment point of trader type 1 is (0.8, 0.2). The initial Indifference 
map of trader type 1 (cyan color) and trader type 2 (brown color) are drawn through the 
endowment point.  
A second set of indifference maps are drawn so they are tangential to each other. The point of 
tangency is the competitive equilibrium (CE) point and the slope of the straight line from 
endowment point and the CE point (not drawn on screen) is the CE price.  
The contract curve is drawn in green.  
The pink curve from endowment point to the contract curve is the bisection locus of the angle 
between the indifference maps.  
Except when the indifference maps are symmetrical, the point of intersection of the bisection 
locus with the contract curve does not coincide with CE. 
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Simulation: The step size for simulated transactions is set at 0.02 (Euclidean distance (x2+y2)0.5). 
As each transaction is completed, a black-green line shows the movement of endowment point in 
steps of size 0.02.  
In the right bottom of the screen, the bids and asks are shown in dots and completed transactions 
are shown in a continuous gray line. Horizontal gray line marks the CE price as a benchmark.  
Cyan and brown lines show the current level of utility of trader types 1 and 2 respectively, and 
chart the change in utilities from the initial endowment level towards the end of simulation. The 
horizontal colored lines indicate the utility levels attained by the two types of traders at CE (cyan 
for Type 1 and brown for Type 2). The third colored line (purple) is the average utility for both 
types of traders.  
 
Parameters for Simulations 
Utility of Type 1 traders: x0.4y0.6 
Utility of Type 2 traders: x0.8y0.2 
Endowment point: (0.8, 0.2) 
Simulation step size (transaction quantity in Euclidean distance (x2+y2)0.5): 0.02 
Number of Iterations 1000 
 
Table 1A 
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Table 1B 
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Table 2 
Parameters of Four Computational Economies 
(Cobb-Douglas Utility Function) 
 
Parameter Economy 1 Economy 2 Economy 3 Economy 4 
α 0.4 .7 .3 .4 
β 0.8 .4 .5 .2 
Initial Endowment (0.8, 0.1) (0.8, 0.1) (0.8, 0.1) (0.8, 0.1) 
Number of Iterations 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 
Discrete Transaction Size 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
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Figure 1: Competitive Equilibrium in Edgeworth Box with Cobb Douglas Utility 
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Figure 2: Final Trading Positions in Edgeworth Box for Two Groups of 14 Human Traders 
 
(Initial Endowment: 0.88,0.18; Competitive Equilibrium: 0.58,0.79; Average Holdings at the end: 0.57, 0.69) 
(Group 1: Initial Utility = 0.933, CE Utility = 1.31, Average Utility at the end = 1.22) 
(Group 2: Initial Utility = 0.0.35, CE Utility = 0.73, Average Utility at the end = 0.803) 
Legend: Group 1 Traders in solid triangles, Group 2 Traders in hollow circles)
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Figure 3: Time Series of Prices (Green Chips per Red Chip) Reported in Edgeworth Box Human Trader Experiment 
(Competitive Equilibrium Price = 0.49, Average Price = 0.64, 55 transactions among 14 pairs of traders)
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Figure 4: Zero-Intelligence Bids and Asks 
Panel A          Panel B 
 
 
X
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Infeasible Region 
Utility Loss Region 
Bid X 
Ask X 
Y
0
0 . 1
0 . 2
0 . 3
0 . 4
0 . 5
0 . 6
0 . 7
0 . 8
0 . 9
1
0 0 . 2 0 . 4 0 . 6 0 . 8 1
X
Y
A s k 1
B i d  2
A s k 2
B i d  1
r
  
Convergence of Double Auctions in Edgeworth Box, 6/4/2004  
Figure 5: Four Computational Economies for Double Auctions with Zero-Intelligence Traders 
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Figure 6: Endowment Paths from Initial to Contract Curve in Four Computational Economies  
(Double Auctions with Zero-Intelligence Traders)  
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Figure 7: Movement of the Economy to the Contract Curve in a Double Auction 
(Not Drawn to Scale) 
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Figure 8: Distribution of End Points of the Endowment Paths around Contract Curves in Four Computational Economies  
(Double Auctions with ZI Traders)  
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Figure 9: Transaction Price Paths including Mean and Standard Deviation of Prices in Four Computational Economies  
(Double Auctions with ZI Traders) 
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